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O ne of the m ost in terestin g issues in co n tem p o rary philosophy of m ind is: how to explain the qu alitative c h a ra c te r of conscious m en tal states a n d processes? The question is im p o rtan t b ecau se if we can fin d any plausible ex p lan atio n of th a t p rob lem it w ould certainly have im p o rtan t im plications fo r th e imp o rta n t tra d itio n a l philosophical issue, n am ely -the m ind-body problem . But w hat does th a t m ean: »the qualitative c h a ra c te r of conscious m e n tal states an d processes«? It is clear (for those who have luck not to be blind) th a t th e re a re distinctive qualitative fea tu re s in seeing re d in com parison w ith those in seeing green, fo r exam ple. Obviously, introspectibility is th e crucial p ro p erty of o u r m en tal states a n d processes th a t allow s us to d eterm ine th e ir qualitative character. There is alw ays »som ething th a t it is like« to see blood, to listen to Beethoven, to sm ell a lilac, to feel a pain, to touch cold m etal, to taste a lem onade, etc. In re fe rin g to th a t »som ething th a t it is like«, to th a t qualitative c h a ra c te r of o u r conscious experience, philosophers u su ally use the term q uale (pi. qualia) trying to em phasize the qualitative aspect w hich o th e r m en tal states, such as beliefs, intentions, etc. lack. Such m e n ta l states (with nonqulitative character) are p arad ig m atic exam ples of so called propositional attitu d es -m en tal states w hose content c an be specified by a proposition. Such ch arac terization (in the fo rm of propositional attitudes) seem s ra th e r p lausible fo r beliefs a n d intentions, b u t difficulties a p p e a r w hen we try to apply it fo r the introspectible qualitative p ro p erty c h a ra cteristic fo r the sm ell of a lilac, fo r exam ple. Even if everyone knew the sm ell of a lilac, th ere w ould be no conclusive objective evidence fo r determ ining the identity o r nonidentity of subjecti ve experiences caused by sm elling the lilac. M oreover, I am not even sure if m y present experience of sm elling th e lilac is identi cal to my analogous experience th a t occured 5 y ears ago. As we can see, we have serious troubles just trying to individuate the entity. But, m oreover, even if we put aside th a t problem , I w on d er a re th ere any possibilities fo r tra n slatin g th e m en tal entities into verbal o r symbolic (propositional) m edium w ithout resid u um. In other words, I w ant to em phasize the fact th a t propositio n al specification of the qualitative c h a ra c te r of o u r subjective experiences still rem ains a n open question. So w hat do we have as a help in u n d erstan d in g the n a tu re of qu alia? U nfortunately, it seem s th a t only introspection a p p ea rs as a b rid g e th a t connec ts us with o u r m ental content -unfortun ately , because th a t bridge is not a reliable one.
Anyway, we m ust accept the u n p le asa n t fact th a t it is h a rd even to define the notion of q u alia o r m aybe it is b e tte r to say th a t there a re no consensus in defining such a notion. At first sight, it seem s th a t we all know very well w hat q u alia are, especi ally on the epistem ic level, but ag reem en t very soon disap p ears at th e ontological o r sem antical level of ex p lan atio n of th a t »mysterious« entity. Some philosophers have fo u n d ed th e ir stra tegy, concerning the problem of qualia, in denying the existence od qualia. For them , qualia a re sim ply not re a l entities a t all. Ho wever, the only evident fact is th a t p hilosophers' intuitions about q u alia extrem ely differ. For som e of them the problem of the existence of qualia is just a pseudoproblem , w hich can be eacily solved relying on progress in such sciences as physics, n e u ro p hysiology, chem istry or biology. For others, q u a lia a re one of the last ditches (with emotions, of course) in defen d in g the notion of m entality, w hich is seriously u n d erm in ed by scientific discoveri es in the tw entieth century. The optim ism of th e fo rm er (we m ay call them m aterialists comes as a resu lt of p ro g ress in th e socalled neurosciences (for exam ple: neuropsychology, neurophysio logy, neurology, etc.), and, also, in th e field of artificial intelli gence. But, the g re a te r their euphoria, the stro n g er a re the la tte r in defending the existence of the content of consciousness (with q u alia as one of the m ost useful defense weapons).
For me, the m ost interesting is the attitude which says th a t the notion of q u alia should be com pletely a b an d o n ed (as we h a ve ab an d o n ed the notion of phlogiston o r e lan vital), because it is seriously flaw ed an d m ay lead us in a com pletely w rong way. C onsequently, the problem of q u alia is, in fact, a pseu d o p ro b lem, because the reality of q u alia is denied e ith e r as content of consciousness o r even as m ental re p resen tatio n of pro p erties of the ex tern al objects. In short, it is a position th a t tre a ts q u alia as nonexisting objects. Paul a n d Patricia C h u rc h lan d are, am ongst others, philosophers who hold th a t position, b u t I th in k it is m ost explicitly re p re se n te d in D aniel D ennett's p a p e r »Quining Q ua lia«1. A ccording to m y view, the explan atio n of q u alia is still a problem , not a pseudoproblem . So, in this p ap er, I shall try to prove th a t D ennett's argum ents, ag ain st the existence of qualia, are, a t least, not conclusive. I agree w ith D ennett th a t th e source of m isu n d erstan d in g s lies in the notion of qualia, b u t I do not a g ree th a t elim inative m aterialism is the a d eq u a te strateg y fo r u n d e rstan d in g th e n a tu re of p h en o m en a th a t occur in o u r conscio usness.
The term q u a lia has its origin in the seventieth century, but it d id n 't becom e widely accepted u n til th e stru c tu ra list m ove m ent in psychology. S tructuralists in tro d u ced the term and con sidered q u alia as simple, u n in te rp re te d elem ents of experience, so q u alia were, according to th e ir doctrine, one of th e basic ob jects of th eir exam inations. O n the philo so p h ers' side in 1923. C. D. B road p re sen te d a classical version of th e theory of q u a lia 1 2, but, in English, the term q u a lia is in tro d u ced in 1929 by C. I. Le wis3. In the last 20 years the problem of q u a lia h as becom e one of the m ost in trig u in g issues in the focus of ph ilo so p h ers' interest. W e m ay say th a t th e initial m otivation fo r th e revival of interest cam e in 1974. w ith a p a p e r of Thom as Nagel: »W hat Is It Like to Be a Bat?«, w hich is now adays tre a ted as a classic in the field of philosophy of m ind. In th a t p a p e r N agel tries to em phasize the gap which every objective th eo ry m ust overcom e, if it aspires to explain the m ind-body problem . That gap is fo u n d ed on the exis tence of the subjective c h a ra c te r of experience, and, consequen tly, on the existence of qualia. A fter th a t p a p e r lots of p ap ers a p p e a re d as a n attem p t to show th a t the alleged subjective ch a ra c te r of experience is just a n illusion a n d th a t it can be cap tu re d w ith objective explanation. W h eth er only attem p ts o r re a l successes, as a re su lt we have various physicalistic, behaviouristic or functionalistic theories in explan atio n of qualia. On the ot h e r side, we have nu m ero u s p ap ers re p re se n tin g a defense of irreducibly m e n tal fe a tu re s -qualia. From th e p resen t perspec 1. T he ex p re ssio n »to quine* is used in a n iro n ic al sense, a n d its m e an in g : »to d e n y reso lu tely the existence o r im p o rta n c e a t so m e th in g re a l o r significant« D en n e tt took fro m PHILOSOPHICAL LEXICON, (1978) , w hose ed ito r w as D en n e tt him self. tive, it is obvious th a t we'll have to w ait fo r a consensus w hen we talk about qualia. I think it is the speculativity of arg u m en ts th at disables us to have a final judgem ent, but, I hope we can find a n ad eq uate solution with a »little« help from scientific discoveries. But, let's attend to D ennett's paper, which is divided into th ree partes. In the first p a rt he shows w hat philosophers u s u a l ly m ean w hen they use the term qualia. He, also, exam ines the relation of the notion of q u a lia an d the h u m a n experience. In the second p art D ennett tries to destroy th e traditional concept of q u alia giving an excellent exam ple with a case of a putative q u alia inversion, and in the third p a rt he tries to explain why the traditional (or shall we say folk-psychological) concept of q u alia seem s so attractive, an d how its acceptance can cloud the re a l tru th about qualia. Of course, he also offers a solution fo r th a t problem (which is a pseudoproblem., in his opinion) -com plete ab an d o n m en t of the m isleading concept of qualia. There a re two aspects of his strategy for denying the existence of som ething th at tradition calls qualia. W hen D ennett proves that trad itio n al concept of q u alia has no extension he takse a position of elim in ative m aterialism . A ccording to th a t philosophical position o u r folk-psychological concepts necessarily m islead us in u n d e r stan d ing the internal states an d processes specific for o u r »m en tality«, so, they deserve a thorough revision o r com plete a b a n donm ent, elim ination (as in the case of elan vital o r phlogiston). They should be replaced with concepts which extension includes only physical entities. This is the reaso n why only m aterialistic theories (for exam ple m atu red neuroscience) can explain and predict our internal states a n d processes. The second aspect of D ennett's strategy is based on the tradition of philosophical be haviourism , which assum es that conceptual confusion is the real source of philosophical problem s. A ccording to the philosophi cal behaviourists, in principle, it is possible to describe all o u r in ternal states and processes taking into account only o u r o b ser vable potential or actual behaviour. T hat kind of description should refer only to o u r reactions to stim uli and to the disposi tional properties fo r reacting, which m eans th a t q u alia get tlieir m eaning with operational definitions, because they a re n o th in g m ore than physical properties th a t can be defined as a resu lt of a p a rtic u la r set of operations.
In D ennett's opinion we m ake a big m istake if we th in k th a t we can isolate qualia, or, in o th e r words, the way things look, sound, feel, taste, sm ell to us from : 1) stim ulation (in this case D ennett has big troubles in ex p lain ing the occurence of m ental im ages, which, in m y opinion, RFFZd, 28(5) (1988/89) B. BERIĆ: ON THE EX ISTENCE... can occur w ithout observable ex tern al stim ulation. O f course, his answ er is th a t th e trad itio n al concept of th e m en tal im age should be a b an d o n e d fo r the sim ilar reaso n s as in the case of qualia)4
2) n on-perceptual influence (I have to say th a t this is a very im p o rtan t aspect of o u r problem . We can 't deny th a t memory, for exam ple, h as g re a t significance in assum ed q u a lia p roduc tion But, how to isolate, and especially how to m easure, its in flu ence still rem ain s a serious problem . I think th a t o u r present poor u n d e rsta n d in g of h u m a n cognitive o rg an izatio n should not serve as a re a so n fo r a claim th a t we can no t in principle m ea sure, fo r exam ple, th e influence of m em ory on pro d u cin g the m ental im age of sk u n k 's smell)
3) behaviour (this is not so obvious. Most of the people have strong intuitive appeal th at som ething »mental«, for exam ple qualia, occur betw een the ap p ea ra n ce of stim ulus an d the reac tion to th a t stim ulus. I shall try to supp o rt th a t intuition with the following exam ple: Every experienced teleg rap h ist is certainly well acquianted with the tim edifference in his reactions to au d i ble signals of M orse code (when he was unexperienced in teleg raphy he needed m uch m ore time fo r his b eh av io u ral reaction). His behavioural reactio n usually consists of w riting an ap p ro p ri ate sym bol fo r various signals. Let us im agine two telegraphists -one is experienced a n d the o th er unexperienced. Im agine, th a t at the sam e time, they have the sam e stim ulus -fo r exam ple, the sound th a t re p re se n ts »E«. It is obvious th at th e ir behavi oural reactio n will d iffer in time. Why is it so? O f course, to be a good teleg rap h ist is a learn ed skill and the reactio n tim e also depends on abbilities, m em ory, concentration o r som e o th er fac tors. But, the question is: can we isolate in tim e th e ir reaction, th eir behaviour from the ap p ea ra n ce of quale. I th in k we can, in a rough way, but, in principle, it is possible. In m y opinion quale a p p ea rs approxim ately a t the sam e time, w hich can be proved with telegraphists' rep o rts based on introspection, but, behaviou ra l reaction obviously differs, which m ean s th a t we can look at q u alia a n d b eh av io u ral reaction as distinctive entities) 4) belief (at this point I also disagree w ith D ennett. Let's con sider a n a rg u m e n t fro m illusion, based on consum ing LSD. Im agine th a t we have a n experience of seeing a deep hole painted 4. For m ore d etailed p ictu re, see his p ap e rs: -The N a tu re of Im ag es a n d th e Intro spective T ra p -,
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pink, as a result of LSD influence. So, our belief is th a t we have a Pink object in fro n t of us. For the sake of arg u m en t, let us a s sum e th at we are, at the sam e time, aw are th a t o ur experience could be the result of drugs, and, in that case, is not b ased u p o n a re a l existence of the pink hole. To prove th a t th e p in k hole is, in fact, a n unexisting object, let's im agine th a t we tak e a w alk over the unexisting pink hole as a reaction to o u r ex p erien tial data. In such exam ple we w ould have two beliefs: epistem ic an d ontological. Epistemic belief would be th at the hole is pink co loured. A ccording to the first prem ise of my arg u m en t, o u r h a l lucinating experience is produced by LSD influence, but, at the sam e time, it seem s plausible th a t o u r epistem ic b elief is induced by som ething, which m eans th a t o u r epistem ic belief h a s som e kind of a cause, an d I can not see any plausible cause except the ap p earan ce of o u r h allucinating experience of the pink hole. M oreover as fa r as I can see we do not any object out of the con scious dom ain th at can serve as a n explanation fo r o u r epistem ic belief. This m eans th a t th ere a re no ex tern al cause of o u r epistem ic belief (rem em ber th a t we do not believe th a t th e pink hole really exists), w hich leads us to the conclusion th a t th ere m ust be some kind of a n in te rn a l cause. O f course, acco rd in g to my view, it is m ost plausible to postulate the existence of q u alia as a n internal causes of, a t least, som e of o u r epistem ic beliefs. However, D ennett m ay (or must) say th a t the cause o f o u r epis tem ic belief is only LSD. Such a theory should have to seek ex p lan atio n fo r the epistem ic beliefs on the unconscious level of cognitive inform ation processing. But, in th a t case, th e p h e n o m enological level would be left com pletely u n ex p lain ed a n d th e predictive pow er of the theory w ould be n e a r to nothing. How ever, it seem s th a t it is possible to tre a t p hen o m en al fe a tu re s of o u r experiences as causes of o u r epistem ic beliefs, w hich p re supposes th at they can be isolated. The second belief is of a n o n tological nature, because it serves us as a g ro u n d fo r believing th at d a ta presented by o u r consciousness m ay not co rresp o n d to external reality. In o u r case, such d ata co rrespond only to o u r specific hallucination. In the case o f ontological belief it is obvi ous that it has no constitutive influence on epistem ic belief (that the hole is pink coloured), so, it a p p ea rs th a t we can isolate m uch easier quale from this k in d of belief). W hat is im p o rtan t is that. D ennett denies the distinctiveness of q u alia from m em ory o r beliefs or dispositions to re a ct to cer ta in stim ulus a n d concludes th a t th ere a re no such th in g s as qualia. C ontrary to his view, I think th a t qualia exist a n d th a t th e deceiving inability fo r clear differentiation of q u a lia fro m th e ir RFFZd, 28(5) (1988/89) B. BERIĆ: O N THE EX ISTEN C E... effects (beliefs a n d behaviour, fo r exam ple) com es fro m the u n resolved ontological a ta tu s of q u a lia a n d not fro m th e ir unexis tence. Since the n a tu re of consciousness is, unfortunately, still a n unresolved problem , we have to except the fact that it is very h a rd to b rin g definite conclusions about, the ontological n a tu re of entities th a t c h aracterize o u r consciousness.
But, let's a tte n d to D ennett's excellent exam ples th a t stand in favor of his view. The first exam ple refers to in trap e rso n al q u al ia shift in the case of C hase an d S anborn -two professional coffee tasters. W hen they began to work, they th o u g h t th a t the Maxwell H ouse coffee was the best tasting coffee in the world. But, a fte r six y ears they a g re e th a t they d o n 't like it any more. For w hat reasons? C hase believes th at his aesthetic attitudes have chan g ed an d S an b o rn thinks th a t som ething's w rong with his taste receptor. The question is: can we believe them ? W hat is undeniable is th a t th e ir statem ents rely on m em ory an d that they liked the coffee, but now they d o n 't. The rest is doubtful, which m ean s th a t we a re not sure w hether C hase's qu ale has really rem ain ed the sam e o r has it grad u ally shifted, o r m ay it be th a t C hase's taste buds have slightly changed. S im ilar p ro b lem s can be applied to S a n b o rn 's case. Such vagueness obvious ly shows that th ere is no incorrigibility in the claim s ab o u t o u r experiences. If we ad m it it, is the existence of any p a rtic u la r q u ale still a n em pirical fact? Are q u alia just hypothetical con structs? O f course, D ennett positively answ ers to the second question, but I believe it is the first question th a t deserves an a f firm ative answ er. I think the rig h t form ulation of th a t question would be: can we get any inform ation from experience? Or: is th ere any available in fo rm atio n in the phenom enological do m ain? I would say -yes. I can accept th a t m em ory has g re a t in fluence in production a n d recognition of alm o st every quale, I can also accept th a t the introspection based claim s a re not in corrigible, but, these two prem ises do not force m e to conclude th a t o u r experience (or introspection) can not o ffer us an y novel info rm atio n I th in k it still rem ain s a n open question. D ennett's second in terestin g exam ple re fe rs to the taste of beer. Is it an a cq u ired taste? Do we really learn to enjoy the fla vour of the first sip of beer? it is very h a rd to accept it, because alm ost everyone w ould say th a t they disliked the way the first sip of b eer had tasted to them . But, w here does the joy of d rin k ing b eer com e from ? Or, in o th e r words, how com e th e beer tastes so b ad to b e e r d rin k in g beg in n er an d so good to experi enced b e e r d rin k er? it seem s plausible to say th a t the long-term experience of b e e r d rin k in g changes the very taste of b e er (in th a t case, the re su lt is not an acquired taste), which leads us to trouble in determ ining the sh arp distinction betw een q u ale and the reaction to quale. In th a t trouble lies the convincingness of D ennett's exam ple. It becom es difficult to individuate the entity (in o u r case, quale of b eer taste), if we can not divide it from its 1 assum ed reaction. The problem of individuation raises the q u es tion of intrinsicality of qualia. It is im portant, because D ennett denies the traditional concept of qualia, and, according to Den nett, tradition treats q u alia as properties which are: 1) intrinsic 2) directly o r im m ediately apprehensib le in consciousness 3) ineffable 4) private. But, let us retu rn to intrinsicality. Intrinsic p ro p erty is u su al ly defined as property belonging to the inner n a tu re of a n entity, an d is opposed to extrinsic property, which doesn't belong to in n er n ature of som ething and derives its n atu re from relational properties of that entity. Among o th er things, it im plies the exis tence of intrinsic properties which a re som ehow atom ic, u n an aiyzable. On the o th er side, we have typically relatio n al o r ex trin sic properties. I adm it that this distinction (intrinsic -extrinsic) is ra th e r obscure because there a re no reliable criterium th a t can help us to determ ine which properties a re re latio n al a n d which are not. For exam ple, try to determ ine is the b ittern ess an intrinsic o r a relational property! Is o u r attitu d e o r reaction to som e food in any way constitutive in sensing the bitterness of th at food? If it is, we m ust accept the fact th at the b ittern ess of food is paradigm atically a n extrinsic property. This shows' the im portance of »the beer taste« exam ple, because it explicitly shows the w eakness of the position th at defends the existence of intrinsic properties. But, is there any intrinsicality in objects at all? D ennett thinks th a t we should give up on intrinsicality, b u t i d on't. The question of the existence of intrinsic p roperties is a traditional philosophical problem , and 1 think the b u rd en of answ ering it lies on epistemology. O ur epistem ic ability to g rasp the intrinsic properties is highly doubtful. This m ean s th at we can have only belief (not knowledge) about the existence of in trinsic properties, but, this does not m ean th a t th e re a re no such properties. But, how to individuate those candidates fo r intrinsic properties in the case of qualia? I think it is only the qualitative sim ilarity (not sam eness) we can rely on. The question of d e te r m ining the boundaries of qualitatively sim ilar classes of p ro perties still rem ains. That is the real problem . It is a problem , because o u r epistem ic abbilities a re not perfect. We a re not subtle m achines which strictly determ ine the distinction betw een two tastes, sm ells or w hatever. Of course, th a t does no t m ean RFFZd, 28(5) (1988/89) B. BERIĆ: ON THE EX ISTEN CE... th a t we should reject all experiential in fo rm atio n as com pletely u nreliable. It only m ean s th a t we still dq no t have firm epistem o logical ground. D ennett offers a n exam ple fro m sense m odality (taste) w hich is less reliab le th a n visual m odality, fo r exam ple. If we look m ore carefully we can see th a t it is m uch easier to d eter m ine, in visual m odality, th e distinction betw een q u ale a n d re a c tion to quale. For exam ple, let's im agine a m an who once was a p assionate com m unist a n d now he is com pletely disappointed w ith his political ideas. O nce he liked th e re d colour (as one of the m ost pro m in en t com m unist symbols), a n d now it seem s so disgusting to him. Do you really believe th a t his attitu d e changes his seeing of red? Is his reactio n constitutive fo r his q u ale of red? I w ould say -no. It re fe rs only to the change of attitude, b u t his quale h a s still re m a in ed the same.
Are q u alia directly accesible in o u r consciousness? A ccord ing to D ennett -no, we can have only indirect access via re fe r ence to o u r idiosyncratic dispositional capacities fo r resp o n d in g to certain qualitative properties. W hat does th a t m ean ? It m eans th a t we have some k ind of detectors fo r detecting qualitative p ro p erties of o u r experiences, or, in o th e r words, m ed iatin g tools fo r in n e r ostension, I a g re with D ennett only w hen we talk ab o u t recognition of o u r previous experiences, but, w hat ab o u t le a rn ing new inform ation? For exam ple, w hen a child is sm elling fo r the first tim e the sm ell of lilac. O f course, in th a t case the child m ust have dispositional capacities fo r sm elling the lilac, but I c a n 't see an y m ediator o r detector in acq u irin g the first in fo r m ation about the sm ell of lilac. I think it is the thesis w hich de nies the incorrigibility of o u r introspective abbilities th a t led D ennett to the conclusion th a t th e re is no direct accesibility of q u a lia in o u r consciousness. But, incorrigibility is senseless w hen we talk about a cq u irin g new inform ation. So, it seem s th a t th e re a re cases w hen q u a lia are im m ediately ap p reh en sib le in consciousness.
In D ennett's opinion o u r consious experiences have only p ractically ineffable p ro p erties w hich m ean s th a t we can, in principle, give verbal (or symbolic) description of o u r qualia. As a n exam ple of such practically ineffab le p ro p erty D ennett takes the shape pro p erty of one h a lf of th e to rn piece of p ap er. Is it a n a d eq u a te analogy? I th in k it is com pletely m isleading, because we can easily im agine a feasible alg o rith m fo r describing the sh ap e p ro p erty of to rn paper, b u t I do n 't have th e fain test idea ab o u t such algorithm if I w ant to describe the w ay th e lilac sm ells. Besides it, we have the closely connected p ro b lem of the privacy of qualia: can q u a lia be explained in an y objective way? D ennett thinks th a t q u a lia a re private only in the sense of idi osyncratic. But, w hat about a possibility of idiosyncratic u n iq u e ness? C an we escape from ineffability (and privacy) in such cases? Also, the unresolved problem of o th er m inds seem s the u n su rm o u n tab le obstacle fo r an y objective ex p lan atio n of con scious experience.
A fter all, I hope th a t m y (sketches of) a rg u m e n ts have showed th at the notion of q u alia still deserves th e p h ilo so p h ers' attention, in spite of the fact th a t it needs som e (but no t com plete) revision. REFERENCES P atricia C h u r c h l a n d (1986); NEUROPHILOSOPHY, MIT P ress)/A B rad fo rd Book; C am bridge, M assach u ssets P aul C h u r c h l a n d (1984) 
; M A T T E R A N D C O N SCIO U SNESS, MIT P re ss/A
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